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Abstract 
Theoretical  and  empirical  studies  exploring  the  effects  of  income  inequality  upon 
growth  reach  a  disappointing  inconclusive  result.  This  paper  postulates  that  one 
reason for this ambiguity is that income inequality is actually a composite measure of 
at least two different sorts of inequality: inequality of opportunity and inequality of 
returns  to  effort.  These  two  types  of  inequality  affect  growth  through  opposite 
channels, so the relationship between income inequality and growth is positive or 
negative  depending  on  which  component  is  larger.  We  test  this  proposal  using 
inequality-of-opportunity measures computed from the PSID database for 23 states of 
the U.S. in 1980 and 1990. We find robust support for a negative relationship between 
inequality of opportunity and growth, and a positive relationship between inequality of 
returns to effort and growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
A surge of literature on income inequality and growth has emerged over the last two 
decades.
2 On one hand, this literature addresses the causation from growth to inequality, 
and  disputes  about  the  Kuznets  (1955)  and  the  “augmented”  Kuznets  hypothesis 
(Milanovic,  1994),  according  to  which  economic  development  (and  other  socio-
economic  and  political  aspects)  should  eventually  reduce  income  inequality.  On  the 
other hand, the reverse causation is studied, i.e., the effects of income inequality on 
growth. We concentrate on this second channel of influence, whose related literature has 
lead to controversial conclusions. 
The analysis of the relationship between inequality and growth suggests many 
channels  through  which  inequality  can  affect  growth.  Accumulation  of  savings 
(Galenson  and  Leibenstein,  1955),  unobservable  effort  (Mirrless,  1971),  and  the 
investment  project  size  (Barro,  2000)  are  some  of  the  main  routes  through  which 
inequality  may  enhance  growth.  On  the  contrary,  inequality  can  negatively  affect 
growth through the following channels: unproductive investments (Mason, 1988), levels 
of nutrition and health (Dasgupta and Ray, 1987), demand patterns (Marshall, 1988), 
capital market imperfections (Banerjee and Newman, 1991), fertility (Galor and Zang, 
1997),  domestic  market  size  (Murphy  et  al.,  1989),  political  economy  (Persson  and 
Tabellini,  1994),  and  political  instability  (Alesina  and  Perotti,  1996).  Thus,  overall 
inequality would affect growth positively or negatively depending on the channels that 
dominate.  
However, the existing empirical literature does not indicate that any of these 
channels has a predominant influence. As a result, the relationship between inequality 
                                                            
2 Surveys on this issue can be found in Bénabou (1996), Bourguignon (1996), Aghion et al. (1999), 
Bertola et al. (2005) and Ehrhart (2009). 3 
 
and growth turns out to be ambiguous.
3 Empirical papers tend to justify this ambiguity 
through the quality of data (Deininger and Squire, 1996), the inconsistent nature of 
inequality measures (Knowles, 2001), the type of inequality index (Székely, 2003), the 
econometric method (Forbes, 2000) or the set of countries considered and their degree 
of  development  (Barro,  2000).  Thus,  Ehrhart  (2009,  p.  39)  acknowledges  that  the 
overall  rather  inconclusive  econometric  results  suggest  that  either  the  data  and  the 
instruments are not sufficient to estimate the true relationship between inequality and 
growth  or  the  transmission  mechanisms  really  at  work  are  different  from  those 
mentioned in the literature.  
In this paper, we defend the idea that this ambiguity can be due to the concept of 
inequality that has been used in the literature. We base our argument in the idea that 
income inequality is actually a  composite measure of at least two different sorts of 
inequality:  inequality  of  opportunity  (IO)  and  inequality  of  returns  to  effort  (IE) 
(Roemer, 1993; Van de Gaer, 1993).
4 Inequality of opportunity refers to that inequality 
stemming  from  factors  (called  circumstances)  beyond  the  scope  of  individual 
responsibility like race and socioeconomic background. Inequality of returns to effort 
defines the income inequality caused by individual responsible choices. This concept 
reflects the consequences of factors for which individuals can be held responsible like 
the number of hours worked and occupational choice. Thus, overall inequality can be 
seen as the result of heterogeneity in social origins and other factors such as the exerted 
effort.  We  hypothesize  that  these  two  types  of  inequality  may  affect  growth  in  an 
opposite  way.  On  one  hand,  IO  can  reduce  growth  as  it  favors  human  capital 
accumulation by individuals with better social origins or circumstances, rather than by 
                                                            
3 See Banerjee and Duflo (2003) on the inconclusiveness of the cross-country empirical literature on 
inequality and growth. 
4  Though  not  considered  in  this  paper,  another  possible  source  of  inequality  is  luck  (Lefranc  et  al., 
forthcoming). 4 
 
individuals with more talent or skills (Loury, 1981; Chiu, 1998). The greater the IO, the 
stronger the role that background plays, rather than responsibility.
5 On the other hand, 
income inequality among those who exert different effort can stimulate growth because 
it may encourage people to invest in education and effort (Mirrless, 1971). In sum, the 
relationship  between  income  inequality  and  growth  can  be  positive  or  negative 
depending on which kind of inequality prevails on the overall measure.  
The main goal of this paper is to revisit the relationship between inequality and 
growth,  distinguishing  between  the  IO  and  IE  components.  To  the  best  of  our 
knowledge, the current paper is the first attempt to evaluate the relationship between IO 
and growth. For this task, we combine the growth literature from macroeconomics and 
the  inequality-of-opportunity  literature  from  microeconomics.  A  discussion  on  both 
these literatures is presented in Section 2. 
Data requirements for comparing inequality of income across states or countries 
are severe (Deininger and Squire, 1996), but comparisons of IO are even more stringent 
(Lefranc  et  al.,  2008).  This  is  because  empirical  analysis  of  IO  requires  not  only 
comparable measures of individual disposable income but also individual background 
measured in a comparable and homogeneous way. Unfortunately, there are only a few 
databases with information on individual circumstances or social origins. Furthermore, 
the number of circumstances is usually small. In addition, to test for long-term effects 
on  growth,  we  also  need  the  value  of  IO  for  at  least  two  distant  periods  of  time, 
generally 10 years (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). This last requirement limits even 
more the availability of databases. As far as we are aware, the Panel Survey Income 
Dynamics (PSID) database is the only exception that satisfies both requirements and is 
rich enough in terms of cross-sectional heterogeneity, variables and observations. In 
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Section 3, we use depurated data of the PSID database to estimate total inequality and 
IO for a selected set of 23 states in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, note 
that any observed vector of circumstances is by construction a subset of the theoretical 
vector of all circumstances. Consequently, our empirical estimates should be interpreted 
as lower-bound estimates of IO.
6 
Section 4 shows the empirical model and studies the effect on growth of income 
inequality,  IO  and  other  widely  used  control  variables.  Furthermore,  we  decompose 
total  inequality  into  IO  and  IE  components.  We  find  robust  support  for  a  negative 
relationship between IO and growth and a positive relationship between IE and growth. 
Given these findings, the lesson for economic policy is clear. Redistributive policies 
may, in general, increase investment across individuals and thus may increase growth, 
but also may discourage unobservable effort borne by agents. On the contrary, policies 
that  equalize  opportunities  will  improve  individual  investments  without  deterring 
individual effort. Hence, a general redistributive policy does not guarantee any result, 
and growth may increase or decrease depending on which effect prevails. However, 
selected distribution policies reducing IO will promote growth-enhancing conditions for 
the economy. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Inequality of Opportunity and the Inequality–Growth Debate  
The last decade has witnessed an intensive debate about the effects of inequality on 
growth.  Meanwhile,  the  inequality-of-opportunity  literature  has  also  increased  in 
                                                            
6 See Ferreira and Gignoux (2008), among others.  6 
 
importance during the last decade.
7 This section attempts to bring the inequality-of-
opportunity issue into the inequality–growth debate. 
Two different conceptions of equality of opportunity appear in the literature. The 
first  one  is  about  meritocracy  (Lucas,  1995,  Arrow  et  al.,  2000).  In  this  approach, 
individuals are completely responsible for their outcome (income, health, employment 
status, or utility). As a consequence, total inequality is due to individual responsible 
choices. The second conception, which has been developed over the last two decades, 
considers that equal opportunity policies must create a “level playing field”, after which 
individuals are on their own.
8 The “level playing field” principle recognizes that an 
individual’s  outcome  is  a  function  of  variables  beyond  and  within  the  individual’s 
control, called  circumstances  (e.g., socioeconomic, cultural background or race) and 
effort (e.g., investment in human capital, number of hours worked and occupational 
choice), respectively.
9 IO refers to those outcome inequalities that are exclusively due to 
different circumstances. Individuals are, therefore, only responsible for their effort. The 
meritocracy approach is an extreme case for which circumstances are not considered. In 
this paper, we adopt the more general second approach, which distinguishes between 
total inequality and IO. 
                                                            
7 Using the Google Academic Search tool, the term “inequality and growth” appears 608 times between 
1990 and 1999 but 3,690 times between 2000 and 2009. The term “inequality of opportunity” is shown 
696  times  between  1990  and  1999  but  1,460  times  between  2000  and  2009.  However,  the  entry 
“inequality of opportunity and growth” is shown zero times. There is one academic document for each of 
the following entries: “inequality of opportunities and growth”, “equality of opportunities and growth” 
and “equality of opportunity and growth”. This search was made on May 26
th, 2009.  
8 See Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998 and 2002), Van de Gaer (1993), Fleurbaey (1995 and 2008), Roemer et 
al.  (2003),  Ruiz-Castillo  (2003), Peragine  (2002  and  2004),  Checchi  and  Peragine  (2005),  Betts  and 
Roemer  (2007),  Moreno-Ternero  (2007),  Ooghe  et  al.  (2007),  Fleurbaey  and  Maniquet  (2007), 
Bourguignon et al. (2007), Lefranc et al. (2008 and forthcoming), Rodríguez (2008) and Ferreira and 
Gignoux (2008). 
9 Talent could be considered a circumstance, however, this variable is controversial as it might reflect past 
effort of a person (while being a child) and hence is not obviously something for which a person should 
not be held accountable.  7 
 
Two  sets  of  models  have  been  proposed  in  the  inequality–growth  literature: 
models  where  inequality  is  beneficial  for  growth  and  models  where  inequality  is 
harmful for growth. 
On one hand, we find three main reasons for a positive relationship between 
inequality  and  growth.  First,  income  inequality  is  fundamentally  good  for  the 
accumulation of a surplus over present consumption regardless of whether the rich have 
a higher marginal propensity to save than the poor do (Kaldor’s hypothesis). Then, 
more unequal economies grow faster than economies characterized by a more equitable 
income distribution if growth is related to the proportion of national income that is 
saved.
10 Second, following Mirrless (1971), in a moral hazard context where output 
depends on the unobservable effort borne by agents, rewarding the employees with a 
constant wage, which is independent from output performance, will discourage them 
from investing any effort (Rebelo, 1991). Third, since investment projects often involve 
large sunk costs, wealth needs to be sufficiently concentrated in order for an individual 
to be able to initiate a new industrial activity. Barro (2000) proposes a similar argument 
for  education.  Accordingly,  investments  in  physical  or  human  capital  have  to  go 
beyond a fixed degree to affect growth in a positive manner. 
On the other hand, we find three main sets of models in which inequality can 
discourage growth. The first set refers to models of economic development where three 
general arguments can be found (Todaro, 1994): unproductive investment by the rich 
(Mason,  1988);  lower  levels  of  human  capital,  nutrition  and  health  by  the  poor 
(Dasgupta and Ray, 1987); and biased demand pattern of the poor towards local goods 
(Marshall, 1988). The second set groups models of imperfect capital markets, fertility 
and domestic market size. Wealth and human capital heterogeneity across individuals 
                                                            
10 See Galenson and Leibenstein (1955), Stiglitz (1969) and Bourguignon (1981). 8 
 
produces a negative relationship between income inequality and growth whether capital 
markets  are  imperfect  and  investment  indivisibilities  exist.
11  According  to  the 
endogenous fertility approach, income inequality reduces per capita growth because of 
the  positive  effect  that  inequality  exerts  on  the  rate  of  fertility.
12  Moreover,  the 
production of manufactures is only profitable if domestic sales cover at least the fixed 
setup  costs  of  plants.  Consequently,  redistribution  of  income  may  increase  future 
growth by inducing higher demand of manufactures.
13 Finally, the third set of models 
refers to the political economy literature, where two arguments can be found. First, in a 
median-voter  framework,  a  more  unequal  distribution  of  income  leads  to  a  larger 
redistributive policy and thus to more tax distortion that deters private investment and 
growth.
14 Second, strong inequality may result in political instability.
15  
As a  conclusion  from the last two paragraphs, inequality  may  affect  growth 
through a large variety of opposite routes. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, the 
prevalence of a positive or negative relationship between overall inequality and growth 
depends on which channel predominates. This fact is clearly reflected by the empirical 
evidence linking income inequality to economic growth: cross-sectional and panel data 
studies  are  generally  inconclusive.  Cross-sectional  analysis  showing  a  negative 
relationship  between  both  dimensions  include,  among  others,  Alesina  and  Rodrik 
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Clarke (1995), Perotti (1996), Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) and Alesina et al. (1996). However, other authors find a positive relationship 
between  growth  and  income  inequality,  such  as  Partridge  (1997)  and  Zou  and  Li 
                                                            
11 See Banerjee and Newman (1991), Galor and Zeira (1993), Bénabou (1996), Aghion and Bolton (1997) 
and Piketty (1997). 
12 See Galor and Zang (1997), Dahan and Tsiddon (1998), Morand (1998), Khoo and Dennis (1999) and 
Kremer and Chen (2002). 
13 See Murphy et al. (1989), Falkinger and Zweimüller (1997), Zweimüller (2000) and Mani (2001). 
14 See Perotti (1992 and 1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994). 
15  See  Gupta  (1990), Tornell  and  Velasco  (1992),  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1996),  Alesina  et  al.  (1996), 
Svensson (1998) and Keefer and Knack (2002). 9 
 
(1998). Barro  (2000) shows a very slight relationship between both variables when 
using panel data, while Forbes (2000) finds a positive relationship. 
Given  these  different  findings  in  the  literature,  we  propose  to  analyze  the 
inequality  and  growth  relationship  using  the  IO  concept.  In  particular,  models  à  la 
Mirrless, where a positive relationship between inequality and growth is found, have to 
do with incentives to merits and effort, so they can be associated with inequality of 
returns to effort. On the other hand, models where inequality is harmful for growth 
have to do with the negative impact that certain adverse circumstances may have on 
growth. In this case, these models are closed related to the inequality-of-opportunity 
concept. Consequently, by considering the IO component, we can discriminate between 
some positive and negative influences upon growth. In Sections 4, we test our proposal 
with  an  inequality–growth  empirical  analysis  for  the  U.S.  economy  but  before,  we 
estimate IO in the next section.  
 
3. Inequality of Opportunity in the U.S. 
In this section we estimate the IO in the U.S. by using depurated data of the Panel 
Survey Income Dynamics (PSID) database for 23 states in the 1980s and 1990s. First, 
we present the method; next, we describe the database; and finally, we show the main 
results. 
3.1. The conceptual approach 
This section is based on Roemer (1993) and Van de Gaer (1993). Consider a finite 
population of discrete individuals indexed by i ∈ {1, …, N}. As is standard in the 10 
 
inequality-of-opportunity  literature,  the  individual  income,  yi,  is  assumed  to  be  a 
function of the amount of effort, ei, that is expended and the set of circumstances, Ci, 
that the individual faces, and it is denoted by  ) , ( i i i e C f y = . Circumstances are traits 
beyond the individual responsibility, while effort represents those factors for which the 
individual is responsible. In this context, effort is not only the extent to which a person 
exerts herself, but all the other background traits of the individual that might affect her 
success,  but  that  are  excluded  from  the  list  of  circumstances.  We  treat  effort  as  a 
continuous variable, while, for each individual i, Ci is a vector of J elements, each 
element  corresponding  to  a  particular  circumstance.  Finally,  circumstances  are 
exogenous  because  they  cannot  be  affected  by  individual  decisions,  while  effort  is 
influenced,  among other factors, by  circumstances. Consequently, individual income 
can be rewrite as  )) ( , ( i i i i C e C f y = .  
In order to estimate IO, we partition the population into a mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive set of types Γ = {H1, …, HM}, where all individuals in each type m share the 
same set of circumstances. That is, H1 ∪ H2 ∪ … ∪ HM = {1, …, N}, Hr ∩ Hs = ∅,  ∀ r 
and s, and Ci = Ck, ∀ i and k |i ∈ Hm and k ∈ Hm , ∀ m. Furthermore, assume that the 
distribution of effort exerted by individuals of type m is 
m F  and that  ( ) π
m e  is the level 
of effort exerted by the individual at the 
th π quantile of that effort distribution. Given 
the type m, we can, hence, define the level of income obtained by the individual at the 
th π quantile as follows: 
( ) )) ( ( π π
m m m e y v = .  (1) 
In  this  manner,  the  income  rank  and  the  effort  rank  are  the  same  within  each  type 
because,  given  a  particular  type,  income  is  fully  and  monotonically  determined  by 11 
 
effort. We follow Van de Gaer (1993) in considering the set of incomes available to the 
members of each type as the opportunity set of each type.  





 = ∫ ∫ π π π π d v d v v





1 ,   (2) 
the M-dimensional vector of average incomes. We can interpret each element of the 
vector v as the expected income of each type or category of origin.  
At this point, Roemer (1993) proposed the “mean of mins” approach: take the 
minimum at each centile of the conditional distribution of income (across types), and 
then average across centiles. Alternatively, Van de Gaer (1993) proposed the “min of 
means” approach: average income for each type, and then take the minimum across 
types. Because of the limited size of our samples, as discussed below, we adopt the 
second  method  because  it  is  much  less  restrictive  in  terms  of  data  requirements.
16 
Consequently,  Van  de  Gaer  (1993)  proposed  to  maximize  the  minimum  average 
income: 
{ } π π d v v Min
m
m ) ( min ) (
1
0 ∫ = .  (3) 
Van  de  Gaer  favored  the  minimum  function  to  keep  with  the  Rawlsian  maximin 
principle. However, his proposal is exposed to extreme values because it focuses only 
on the minimum average income. To reduce this problem, we adopt an inequality index, 
                                                            
16 Roemer’s approach requires measuring income differences between types by centiles, while Van de 
Gaer’s  method  only  measures  income  differences  between  types  at  the  mean.  Nevertheless,  both 
mechanisms  produce  the  same  rankings  when  the  transition  matrices  between  origins  and  income 
quantiles are “Shorrocks monotonic”. See Van de Gaer et al. (2001) for more details on this point. 12 
 
which considers the whole vector  v of average incomes.
17 In particular, we use the 
Theil 0 (T) and Gini (G) indices.
18 Moreover, in Section 4 we show that considering the 
Theil 0 index has a major advantage, namely, it allows us to decompose the overall 
inequality  into  inequality-of-opportunity  and  inequality-of-returns-to-effort 
components. 
In  the  rest  of  the  section,  we  compute,  after  presenting  the  data,  overall 
inequality and IO according to the Theil 0 and Gini indices. 
3.2. The data 
The PSID database provides data for U.S. states during the period 1968–2007. This 
database contains information not only on individual income and circumstances but also 
on the state of residence. However, there is still a problem: data are representative at the 
national level, but they do not have to be necessarily at the state level. To minimize this 
problem, we have made a reasonable selection of data, states and decades. Nevertheless, 
some robustness analysis has been carried out in order to mimic the sample selection 
bias. 
Samples refer to individuals who are male heads of household, 25–50 years old, 
which are the cohorts with the highest proportion of employed persons. This sample 
selection  rule  allows  us  to  avoid  the  so-called  composition  effect  (individuals  with 
                                                            
17 The use of an inequality index instead of the minimum function is also proposed in Checchi and 
Peragine (2005), Moreno-Ternero (2007), Rodríguez (2008) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2008).  
18 The Theil 0 index is positively related to total inequality and has a value between 0 and ln(N), where N 
is the sample size. The Gini coefficient is also positively related to total inequality and has a value 


































different  ages  are  in  different  phases  of  the  wage-earning  time  series).  Another 
advantage of this rule is that individual earnings will be more  representative of the 
individual’s lifetime income (Grawe, 2005). Income is calculated as the individual’s 
labor income plus the household capital income divided by the number of adults in the 
household. 
We consider race and the father’s education as the individual’s circumstances, 
which is standar in the inequality-of-opportunity literature.
19 Notice that the observed 
vector  of  circumstances,  which  depends  on  the  available  data,  is  by  construction  a 
subset of the theoretical vector of all possible circumstances. As a result, our empirical 
estimates should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates of IO. Naturally, this implies 
that the non-estimated IO (due to unobserved circumstances) would still remain in the 
IE component (see Section 4.4 below). 
Thus,  for  the  selected  set  of  circumstances,  the  sample  is  partitioned  into  8 
groups  (i.e.,  M  =  8):  four  related  to  the  father’s  education  (no  education,  primary, 
secondary and tertiary education), and two related to race (white and others).
20 In this 
case,  the  estimated  inequality-of-opportunity  index  is  called  “8-groups”.  Note  that 
estimates of IO may increase (but cannot decrease) with the number of types, though an 
excessive number of types may cause few observations in some types. For the sake of 
robustness, we will estimate in Section 4 IO using separately the categories of race 
(“IO-race index”) and father’s education (“IO-edu index”). 
To have enough degrees of freedom to estimate IO, we disregard those states 
with less than 50 observations. Using this criterion, there are only 17 states in 1970 with 
                                                            
19 See references in footnote 8. 
20 Information on mother’s education is not available for the whole period. “No education” means 5 
grades or less; “primary” education goes from 6 grades to 11 grades; “secondary” education refers to 12 
grades and 12 grades plus non-academic training; and, “tertiary” education refers to college  with or 
without degree. Results do not change significantly if we modify the partition of father’s education.  14 
 
at least 50 observations. Moreover, there were  2,116 observations for the U.S. as a 
whole in 1970, whereas the numbers of observations were 3,091 and 3,843 in 1980 and 
1990,  respectively.  Hence,  to  assure  a  large  enough  sample  size  for  each  state,  we 
disregard the 1970s and focus on the 1980s and 1990s. For these two decades, our final 
sample  reduces  to  the  following  23  states:  Arkansas,  California,  Florida,  Georgia, 
Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maryland,  Massachusetts,  Michigan, 
Mississippi,  Missouri,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
3.3. Inequality of income and opportunity in the U.S. states 
For the 23 selected U.S. states, Tables 1 and 2 show income inequality and IO estimates 
for 1980 and 1990, respectively.
21 They show results for the Theil 0 and Gini indices 
and  for  the  IO  8-groups  estimates.  We  also  provide  the  standard  error  estimates 















) ˆ ( ˆ σ ,                    (4) 
where I is the corresponding index and R is the number of replications.
22 Bearing in 
mind  the  limited  size  of  our  samples,  the  estimated  standard  errors  for  the  income 
inequality and IO indices are rather precise.  
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                            
21 Note that we work with truncated samples of male heads of household, so direct comparisons of our 
estimations with the published inequality indices by states would be misleading. 
22 In our calculations, we have assumed R = 1000. Cowell and Flachaire (2007) find that bootstrap tests 
usually improve numerical performance. Moreover, with small sample sizes it could be better to use a 
bootstrap approach that guarantees a better level of approximation to the nominal confidence intervals 
(Davison and Hinkley, 2005). 15 
 
Now,  we  give  a  brief  descriptive  analysis  of  the  inequality-of-opportunity 
results. Figures 1a and 1b represent, respectively, inequality of income and the 8-groups 
IO for the selected 23 U.S. states in 1990 for the Theil 0 and Gini indices. We have 
ranked  the  U.S.  states  by  the  Gini  index.  Comparing  the  income  inequality  and  IO 
results, we observe substantial differences between their rankings. For example, there 
exists a group of states with high total inequality and rather low IO, such as Florida and 
Pennsylvania; the opposite happens in states like Virginia and Indiana. Nevertheless, 
there exist some states whose relative position remains. For example, New York and 
Kentucky are at the lowest levels of both dimensions, while Maryland, New Jersey and 
Tennessee are at the top of the two rankings. These results confirm that inequality of 
income and IO, though related concepts, measure different things.  
We also observe that IO estimates represent a modest percentage of the total 
inequality, above all for the Theil 0 index.
23 The existence of additional representative 
circumstances  capturing  differences  in  opportunity,  other  than  race  and  parent’s 
education, could explain this result.
24 Finally, it is worth noting that the Theil 0 and Gini 
indices reach similar, but not the same, rankings. 
INSERT FIGURES 1a AND 1b ABOUT HERE 
Figures 2a and 2b show the relationship between the 1980–1990 variation of 
total inequality and IO for the Theil 0 and Gini indices, respectively. Only one state, 
New York, has reduced income inequality and IO when looking at both indices, while 
the opposite is found in many states, for example, Maryland, Tennessee, Illinois, New 
                                                            
23 Ferreira and Gignoux (2009) find that between one fifth and one third of all income inequality is 
explained by opportunities in six countries in Latin America. Checchi and Peragine (2005) find that less 
than ten percent of all income inequality is explained by opportunities in Italy. 
24 Another possibility is that income-based IO tends to underestimate IO because the higher measurement 
error  and  variance  for  transitory  components  in  the  distribution  of  income  (in  comparison  with  the 
distribution of consumption) may be effectively counted as inequality of returns to effort (see Ferreira and 
Gignoux, 2009). 16 
 
Jersey  and  Texas.  Besides,  Indiana  and  Iowa  experienced  an  increase  in  IO  while 
showing  little  change  in  total  dispersion.  Kentucky  increased  income  inequality, 
whereas IO decreased notably. Lastly, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and North Carolina 
have not displayed a significant change in their inequality measures. 
INSERT FIGURES 2a AND 2b ABOUT HERE 
Finally, we emphasize the positive relationship between total inequality change 
and  inequality-of-opportunity  change.  However,  this  correlation  is  far  from  being 
perfect (see the coefficients of determination). This result points out that those factors 
affecting the evolution of these two dimensions can be different. As a consequence, the 
impact on growth of each variable could be distinct, as is discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
 
4. Inequality, Inequality of Opportunity and Growth: An Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we carry out the main task of this paper, which is to characterize the 
effects of IO on growth. We assume two consecutive decades, from 1980 to 1990 (the 
80s) and from 1990 to 2000 (the 90s), and our analysis is limited to the selected set of 
23 U.S. states. An advantage of this panel is that heterogeneity within states is not 
coming from the political process because, for the most part, it is similar across the 
different states. More importantly, institutional, cultural, religious and other differences 
are less intensive for U.S. states than for different countries. 
The  dependent  variable  is  the  growth  rate  in  the  ensuing  10  years  of  real 
personal  income  (adjusted  by  CPI)  divided  by  total  midyear  population.  Inequality 
indices and other explanatory variables are all measured at the beginning of each decade 17 
 
(1980 and 1990). This strategy saves us from endogeneity and measurement errors. In 
this manner, we can apply standard pooling regressions techniques, such as in Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991), Partridge (1997) and many others. 
To measure the relationship between inequality, IO and growth properly, the 
model must include additional variables that also affect growth. We use the controls that 
were significant in Partridge (1997). In a first and more parsimonious specification - 
specification (1) -, we consider a convergence term, time and regional dummies and the 
average skills of the labor force. In a second specification - specification (2) -, we also 
include variables capturing sectoral composition and past labor growth.
25  
More specifically, the lagged level of real per capita income is included in the 
model to control for conditional convergence across states.
26 In addition, we consider a 
time dummy for the 80s, and we omit the dummy for the 90s. We also use a standard 
and broad classification for regional variables: West, Midwest, South and Northeast.
27 
The omitted regional dummy is the Northeast region. We consider three categories to 
measure the average skills of the labor force: the percentage of the population over 24 
years old who have graduated from high school but do not have a four-year college 
degree  (high  school);  the  percentage  who  have  graduated  from  a  four-year  college 
(college); and the omitted category, which is the percentage of individuals who have not 
graduated from high school.
28 To control for the initial economic sectoral mix of each 
                                                            
25 Population and personal income data come from the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of 
Economic  Analysis  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/drill.cfm),  while 
CPI  data  come  from  the  U.S.  Department  of  Labor  (All  Urban  Consumers  CPI  series: 
http://www.bls.gov/data/#prices); employment data (total and by type of industry) come from the Current 
Employment  Statistics  of  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor: 
http://www.bls.gov/data/#employment). 
26  As  is  the  norm  in  the  convergence  literature,  an  implicit  assumption  is  that  economic  growth  is 
converging to an equilibrium growth path that is a function of initial conditions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1991) 
27 Regional dummies consider those fixed factors that are time invariant and inherent to each area but are 
not observed or not included in the model, such as geographical, social or local policy regional aspects or 
initial technology efficiency. 
28 Historical Census Statistics on Education Attained in the U.S., 1940 to 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau): 18 
 
state, the shares of nonagricultural employment are included for mining, construction, 
manufacturing, transportation and public utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, 
and  government.  Traded  goods  and  services  are  the  omitted  sector,  and  thus  the 
employment share coefficients should be interpreted as being relative to this sector. The 
percentage of the population who worked on a farm (farm) is included to account for the 
different importance of agriculture across states. Finally, in order to account for the 
possibility that growth in the previous decade could, in turn, influence growth in the 
following  decade  and  be  correlated  with  past  inequality,  we  include  the  percentage 
change  in  nonagricultural  employment  in  the  preceding  decade  (e.g.,  employment 
growth in the 80s is used to explain per capita income growth in the 90s). 
4.1. Income inequality and growth 
The benchmark analysis is based on regressions between growth, lagged income, an 
overall inequality index (Theil 0 and Gini) and the set of control variables: 
it s it i t s it s it it X R T I y GY ε λ δ α φ β + + + + + = − − − ' ' ' · · ,              (5) 
where GYit is real per capita income growth in the decade, yit–s is the real per capita 
income of state i at the beginning of the decade, Iit–s is the overall inequality index at the 
beginning of the decade, Tt is the time dummy corresponding to the 80s, Ri is a set of 
regional dummies, Xit–s groups the rest of control variables measured at the beginning of 
the  decade,  and  finally  εit  encompasses  effects  of  a  random  nature  that  are  not 
considered in the model and is assumed to have the standard error component structure. 
Results for this benchmark setting are shown in Table 3. As in the rest of the paper, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/education/introphct41.html. 19 
 
results are based on the standard OLS pooling  regression and White cross-sectional 
standard errors and covariance matrix. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Regardless of the model specification, the results for the control variables are 
fairly  robust  and  are  in  line  with  the  related  literature.  The  negative  coefficient  for 
lagged  per  capita  income  reflects  conditional  convergence,  and  its  magnitude  is  in 
accordance with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Future economic growth is expected to 
be positively correlated with the labor force’s human capital. As is commonly found in 
growth  models  augmented  for  human  capital,  the  relevant  variable  of  education  is 
college, which is highly positive and significant with respect to the omitted category 
(non-graduated). However, we find that the effect of high school on growth is negative, 
but small, with respect to this category. The coefficients on most of the initial industrial 
mix variables are negative, though only construction is significant. The exception is 
manufacturing, whose coefficient is positive and significant. These findings suggest that 
states with greater initial shares in services and traded goods (the omitted category) and 
manufacturing have experienced higher economic growth.  
The estimates for the farm variable are negative and no significant, while the 
coefficient  associated  with  labor  growth  in  the  preceding  year  is  positive  and 
significant, which corroborates the idea that growth in the previous decade influences 
growth in the following decade. Regarding the cross-regional dummies, the coefficient 
for South is positive and significant for a full-specified model, while that for West is 
negative  and  significant;  the  coefficient  for  Midwest  is  no  significant.  Finally,  the 
dummy for the 80s is positive and significant for a full-specified model. 20 
 
At last, regarding the overall inequality indices, we first notice that Partridge 
(1997) found a positive relationship between overall inequality and per capita income 
growth.  However,  we  find  that  the  initial  Theil  0  and  Gini  coefficients  are  no 
significant.
29 Based on this result, a poor conclusion would be that distributive policies 
would not affect growth. Next, we test whether this result is due to the non-distinction 
between income inequality and IO. As we will see below, controlling by an inequality-
of-opportunity measure changes the policy message dramatically. 
4.2. Inequality of opportunity and growth 
Now, we introduce IO into the model. In particular, we include the IO term into the 
expression (5) to estimate the following model: 
it s it i t s it s it s it it X R T IO I y GY ε λ δ α φ φ β + + + + + + = − − − − ' ' ' · · · 2 1            (6) 
where  IOit–s  is  the  corresponding  inequality-of-opportunity  index  (8-groups)  at  the 
beginning of the decade.  
When including the IO term into the regression, we control for the observed 
circumstances,  i.e.  father’s  education  and  race.  As  a  result,  the  coefficient  of  total 
inequality would now show the effect of effort and those circumstances that are not 
observed. Thus, we would expect that our estimated IO has a negative effect on growth, 
and the positive coefficient of total inequality found in Table 3 turns out significant. 
These results are confirmed for the Theil 0 and Gini indices, as it is shown in Table 4. 
These  findings  support  the  thesis  that  IO  and  inequality  of  returns  to  effort  have 
opposite  effects  upon  growth.  Inequality  is  good  for  growth  when  that  comes  from 
                                                            
29 Note that our results are not directly comparable with Partridge’s; because we use the PSID database, 
our samples refer to male heads of households 25 to 50 years old, and we focus on the 80s and 90s and 23 
selected states. 21 
 
differences in the returns to effort, while it is harmful for growth when that comes from 
differences in opportunity. Accordingly, policies that equalize opportunity and promote 
individual effort will enhance growth. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The  importance  of  this  result  deserves  a  careful  analysis  of  robustness.  The 
number and type of circumstances used, the way that income inequality and  IO are 
combined into the same regression and the number of states considered, are the factors 
that we analyze to be more confident in our main result.  
4.3. Inequality-of-opportunity estimates: the role of circumstances 
Peculiar  non-linearity  effects  on  growth  of  the  educational  structure  might  lead  to 
erroneous conclusions when using father’s education as a circumstance. For instance, 
let’s assume that race is not representative because it does not explain much IO and the 
explicative variables that measure the average skills of the labor force do not completely 
capture the effect of education upon growth. Then, it is possible that the estimated IO 
term,  which  relies  on  the  distribution  of  people  among  four  educational  groups,  is 
actually capturing part of the effect that education may have on growth. This fact might 
cause that the estimated impact of IO would be misleading.
30 To check this possibility, 
we analyze the explicative power of every circumstance alone.  
First, we estimate dispersion in opportunity using separately the circumstance of 
race (IO-race) and father’s education (IO-edu). Table 5 shows the indices of IO for our 
selected U.S. states in 1980 and 1990. We observe that both circumstances are relevant 
for explaining differences in opportunity. For example, when using the Theil 0 index we 
                                                            
30 We are grateful for this suggestion from François Bourguignon. 22 
 
find that IO-race and IO-edu dominate to each other approximately in the same number 
of states in 1990. Therefore, the negative impact of IO on growth found in the previous 
section (see Table 4) cannot be completely ascribed to father’s education. Even if the 
proposed alternative channel through which education may affect growth is true, there is 
still room for a negative and significant impact of IO due to race on growth.  
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Table 6 shows the regression results using the IO-race and IO-edu indices under 
the full specified model. We first notice that the coefficient for the IO-race measure is 
highly significant and negative for both the Theil 0 and the Gini indices. However, the 
impact of IO-edu is unclear because its coefficient is negative but non-significant for the 
Theil 0 and Gini indices. In respect to the coefficient of total inequality, it is positive 
and significant for the 2-groups case (IO-race), and positive but non-significant for the 
4-groups case (IO-edu). Consequently, we can be confident in the estimated impact of 
IO (8 groups), as long as race has been shown to be the driving force explaining the 
negative influence that IO has on growth.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
4.4. Overall inequality decomposition 
Thus  far,  we  have  included  in  the  regressions  indices  of  total  inequality  and  IO. 
However, the total inequality and IO terms are not independent, which may affect the 
estimated coefficient of IO and its significance. In order to avoid this inconvenience, a 
further  refinement  is  possible:  we  can  exactly  decompose  overall  inequality  into 
inequality-of-opportunity  and  inequality-of-returns-to-effort  components.  In  this 23 
 
manner,  the  two  sources  of  income  differences,  circumstances  and  effort,  will  be 
included separately in the regressions.  
As is well known, an inequality index is additively decomposable by population 
subgroups if and only if it is a positive multiple of a member of the Generalized Entropy 
class (Bourguignon, 1979 and Shorrocks, 1980 and 1984). This means that for every 
partition, any member of the Generalized Entropy class can be expressed as the sum of 
two  terms:  a  weighted  sum  of  within-group  inequalities,  plus  a  between-group 
inequality  component.  Only  the  Theil  0  index,  among  the  members  of  the  General 
Entropy class, uses weights based on the groups’ population shares and has a path-
independent  decomposition  (Foster  and  Shneyerov,  2000).
31  For  both  reasons  we 
consider the Theil 0 index throughout this Section. 
Thus, given a particular set of circumstances, consider any partition of income v 
into M groups,  ( )
M v v v ..., ,
1 = , and  v as defined in expression (2), then the Theil 0 







m v T p v T v T
1
) ( ) ( ) ( ,                               (7) 
where  pm  is  the  frequency  of  type  m  in  the  population.  The  first  term,  ) (v T ,  is  a 
between-group  index,  which  captures  the  income  inequality  due  to  different 
circumstances. As it was done in Section 3, this component is calculated by applying 
the Theil 0 index to an income vector in which each individual in a given group receives 
the corresponding group’s mean income. Thus, this component is, by construction, an 
                                                            
31 The rest members of the General Entropy class use weights based not only on the groups’ population 
shares but also on the groups’ income shares. In this manner, these indices give more importance to rich 
people.  24 
 
inequality-of-opportunity index. As said above, its accuracy is conditioned by the set of 
circumstances being selected, which, in practice, depends on the available data. The 
second component is a within-group term, which captures the income inequality within 
each  type  m,  weighted  by  the  demographic  importance  of  the  corresponding  type. 
Because income is a function of effort and circumstances, the within-group component 
then  can  be  considered  as  an  inequality-of-returns-to-effort  index  (the  IE  variable). 
Unfortunately, the estimated IE and IO terms will not be completely orthogonal because 
the non-estimated IO (due to unobserved circumstances) would still remain in the IE 
component.
32 
After decomposing total inequality into inequality-of-opportunity and inequality-
of-returns-to-effort components, we estimate the following model: 
it s it i t s it s it s it it X R T IO IE y GY ε λ δ α φ φ β + + + + + + = − − − − ' ' ' · · · 2 1 .           (8) 
Table 7 shows the results for this model, using the IO (8 groups), IO-race and IO-edu 
estimates.  The  IE  coefficient  is  positive  and  significant,  while  the  IO  coefficient  is 
negative and significant for the IO (8 groups) and IO-race estimates. For the IO-edu 
index,  the  coefficients  for  the  IE  and  IO  variables  are  positive  and  negative, 
respectively,  but  they  are  not  significant.  These  results  are  consistent  with  previous 
findings.  In  particular,  the  two  components  of  total  inequality,  IO  and  IE,  have 
significant but opposite effects upon growth. Moreover, race is more important than 
father’s education in explaining the negative influence of IO on growth.  
                                                            
32 The Gini index generally fails to decompose additively into between- and within-group components. 
Thus, the Gini decomposition is (see, among others, Lambert and Aronson, 1993): 
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where qm is the income share for type m. The first term is the between-groups Gini coefficient, the second 
term is the within-group component, and R is a residual that is zero only in the case that group income 
ranges do not overlap, which does not occur in our case. 25 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
4.5. States  
Now, we change the states considered in the regressions. Because of the limited size of 
our samples, we eliminate those states with fewer observations in 1990.
33 Using the 
specification  in  (8),  we  show  in  Table  8  the  IO  and  IE  coefficients  when  reducing 
recursively the number of states in the regression. Thus, the first line shows the results 
when using all 23 states; the second line shows the results when Arkansas, which is the 
state with lowest number of observations in 1990, is excluded; in the next row, we 
exclude  Arkansas  and  Tennessee,  which  is  the  next  state  with  lowest  number  of 
observations; and so on and so forth for the next rows until we keep with 10 states (20 
observations).
34 Results confirm the positive and significant coefficient for IE and the 
negative and significant coefficient for IO. Reducing the number of states, therefore, 
neither affects our main result. 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Models exploring the incidence of income inequality upon economic growth do not 
reach a clear-cut conclusion. We postulate in this paper that one possible reason for this 
inconclusiveness is that income inequality indices are indeed measuring at least two 
different sorts of inequality: inequality of opportunity and inequality of effort. Though 
                                                            
33 Similar results are obtained if we eliminate those states with fewer observations in 1980. 
34 We are aware of the few degrees of freedom that we have when reducing the number of states, but we 
now care only for the robustness of our results.   26 
 
this distinction has already been emphasized in the inequality-of-opportunity literature, 
it has not yet been considered in the growth literature. 
Using depurated data of the PSID database for 23 U.S. states in 1980 and 1990, 
we  followed  Van  de  Gaer’s  approach  to  compute  inequality-of-opportunity  and 
inequality-of-returs-to-effort indices. We ran standard OLS pooling regressions, finding 
robust support for a negative relationship between inequality of opportunity and growth 
and a positive relationship for the other sort of inequality. Hence, these two types of 
inequalities are affecting growth through opposite channels. On one hand, inequality of 
effort increases growth because it may encourage people to invest in education and to 
exert effort. On the other hand, inequality of opportunity decreases growth because it 
may not favor human capital accumulation of the more talented individuals. In fact, Van 
de Gaer et al. (2001) have pointed out that inequality of opportunity reduces the role 
that talent plays in competing for a position by worsening intergenerational mobility. 
Making a distinction between inequality of income and inequality of opportunity can 
throw some light upon several intriguing empirical facts in the growth literature. Two 
examples are pointed out.  
Barro (2000) shows a positive relationship between growth and inequality within 
most  developed  countries,  while  this  relationship  is  negative  when  looking  at  the 
poorest countries. He proposes, as a tentative explanation, the different role of capital 
markets.  In  particular,  he  considers  that  problems  of  information  (moral-hazard  and 
repayment enforcement problems) are larger in poor countries because they have less-
developed  credit  markets.  However,  he  does  not  find  empirical  evidence  for  this 
different role of capital markets. An alternative explanation that would arise from the 
present  paper  is  that  differences  in  opportunity  are  more  important  within  less-
developed  countries.  At  this  respect,  some  evidence  is  found  in  the  inequality-of-27 
 
opportunity literature as in Ferreira and Gignoux (2009), Checchi and Peragine (2005), 
Rodríguez (2008) and Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps (2009). 
Secondly, some empirical studies have found that the effect of income inequality 
on growth is sensitive to the inclusion of some variables like regional dummy variables 
(Birdall  et  al.,  1995).  However,  the  relationship  between  initial  land  inequality  and 
growth  is  negative  and  robust  to  the  introduction  of  regional  dummies  and  other 
explicative  variables  (Deininger  and  Squire,  1998).  Our  proposal  offers  an  easy 
explanation  for  this  empirical  fact.  Income  inequality  comes  not  only  from  unequal 
opportunities but also from different levels of effort. As a result, the effect of income 
inequality upon growth can have a different sign depending on the kind of controls that 
are  introduced  in  the  regressions.  However,  initial  land  inequality  comes 
unambiguously  from  unequal  opportunities  (i.e.,  the  socioeconomic  conditions  of 
parents) and has a clear-cut negative effect upon growth. 
Further research concerning these issues is clearly needed. However, we believe 
that  a  complete  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  inequality  and  growth 
requires  more  effort  in  constructing  appropriated  databases  that  properly  represent 
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Table 1. Inequality of income and opportunity (8 groups) in 1980 
 
State Obs. Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0
Arkansas 62 0.33424 0.22890 0.08650 0.02149 25.9 9.4
(0.00792) (0.01075) (0.00651) (0.00262)
California 288 0.32272 0.21533 0.09366 0.01687 29.0 7.8
(0.00382) (0.00602) (0.00476) (0.00149)
Florida 91 0.42466 0.33766 0.14481 0.04648 34.1 13.8
(0.00801) (0.01293) (0.01149) (0.00531)
Georgia 96 0.27988 0.23834 0.12551 0.03086 44.8 12.9
(0.00724) (0.02882) (0.01020) (0.00529)
Illinois 96 0.31883 0.19999 0.06997 0.01295 21.9 6.5
(0.00557) (0.00733) (0.00583) (0.00225)
Indiana 87 0.32770 0.21875 0.10313 0.02693 31.5 12.3
(0.00797) (0.01040) (0.00614) (0.00246)
Iowa 57 0.33646 0.20843 0.05522 0.02501 16.4 12.0
(0.00705) (0.00840) (0.00910) (0.00400)
Kentucky 53 0.26658 0.12608 0.14123 0.03461 53.0 27.5
(0.00479) (0.00481) (0.00697) (0.00333)
Luisiana 83 0.39985 0.44742 0.22624 0.08799 56.6 19.7
(0.01128) (0.02907) (0.01380) (0.01181)
Maryland 126 0.30568 0.21192 0.13413 0.03478 43.9 16.4
(0.01258) (0.02000) (0.01525) (0.00734)
Massachusetts 60 0.31730 0.17690 0.06081 0.00733 19.2 4.1
(0.00478) (0.00578) (0.00819) (0.00193)
Michigan 147 0.34835 0.36653 0.13826 0.09811 39.7 26.8
(0.00598) (0.01553) (0.00745) (0.00986)
Mississippi 122 0.38898 0.29497 0.24167 0.11049 62.1 37.5
(0.01821) (0.02564) (0.02319) (0.02069)
Missouri 95 0.33638 0.27555 0.04738 0.01443 14.1 5.2
(0.00689) (0.01305) (0.00747) (0.00203)
New Jersey 79 0.37963 0.31529 0.08450 0.03322 22.3 10.5
(0.00661) (0.01435) (0.00771) (0.00518)
New York 144 0.34521 0.23178 0.09271 0.02401 26.9 10.4
(0.00423) (0.00623) (0.00549) (0.00250)
N. Carolina 142 0.36258 0.24823 0.18670 0.06859 51.5 27.6
(0.00826) (0.01188) (0.01107) (0.00766)
Ohio 136 0.29474 0.17561 0.04477 0.00845 15.2 4.8
(0.00372) (0.00638) (0.00597) (0.00156)
Pennsylvania 162 0.36375 0.35750 0.10150 0.02217 27.9 6.2
(0.00663) (0.01534) (0.00759) (0.00261)
S. Carolina 152 0.34084 0.22259 0.12916 0.03236 37.9 14.5
(0.00711) (0.01091) (0.00815) (0.00409)
Tennessee 53 0.27433 0.16526 0.10089 0.01930 36.8 11.7
(0.00597) (0.00902) (0.00674) (0.00240)
Texas 187 0.30064 0.18843 0.03604 0.00338 12.0 1.8
(0.00426) (0.00774) (0.00594) (0.00102)
Virginia 116 0.28231 0.22889 0.07761 0.01344 27.5 5.9
(0.00452) (0.01668) (0.00617) (0.00218)
    USA 3091 0.34084 0.25252 0.06212 0.01110 18.2 4.4
(0.00543) (0.01036) (0.00645) (0.00275)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
a Inequality of opportunity according to the father's education and race circumstances.
b Inequality of opportunity in relation to total inequality in percentage.  











Table 2. Inequality of income and opportunity (8 groups) in 1990 
 
 
State Obs. Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0
Arkansas 67 0.29706 0.16818 0.09970 0.02648 33.6 15.7
(0.00629) (0.00934) (0.00787) (0.00295)
California 332 0.38229 0.29217 0.10847 0.02388 28.4 8.2
(0.00486) (0.00831) (0.00559) (0.00191)
Florida 129 0.42208 0.35338 0.09126 0.05391 21.6 15.3
(0.00645) (0.01165) (0.00759) (0.00605)
Georgia 112 0.35784 0.26191 0.13932 0.03524 38.9 13.5
(0.00725) (0.01292) (0.01095) (0.00485)
Illinois 115 0.34540 0.34581 0.13757 0.11171 39.8 32.3
(0.00661) (0.01626) (0.00767) (0.01385)
Indiana 89 0.33431 0.22422 0.14120 0.03820 42.2 17.0
(0.00798) (0.01160) (0.00674) (0.00402)
Iowa 72 0.32327 0.20573 0.10085 0.04312 31.2 21.0
(0.00672) (0.00943) (0.01019) (0.00710)
Kentucky 69 0.32882 0.22694 0.09846 0.02041 29.9 9.0
(0.00606) (0.01171) (0.00772) (0.00301)
Luisiana 78 0.38272 0.46783 0.21279 0.08455 55.6 18.1
(0.01027) (0.03272) (0.01288) (0.01163)
Maryland 155 0.49677 0.47258 0.30793 0.16170 62.0 34.2
(0.02059) (0.03707) (0.02393) (0.02413)
Massachusetts 89 0.33443 0.20076 0.05169 0.00630 15.5 3.1
(0.00575) (0.00663) (0.00723) (0.00123)
Michigan 177 0.42317 0.43608 0.17375 0.07565 41.1 17.3
(0.00771) (0.01571) (0.00835) (0.00615)
Mississippi 162 0.37041 0.33277 0.15032 0.03834 40.6 11.5
(0.00857) (0.01695) (0.01044) (0.00551)
Missouri 113 0.33655 0.23957 0.11615 0.02702 34.5 11.3
(0.00567) (0.01008) (0.00831) (0.00339)
New Jersey 101 0.47989 0.46021 0.21257 0.08379 44.3 18.2
(0.01661) (0.02897) (0.01999) (0.01491)
New York 160 0.30540 0.18871 0.05037 0.01171 16.5 6.2
(0.00425) (0.00535) (0.00479) (0.00124)
N. Carolina 214 0.37127 0.28901 0.19076 0.06407 51.4 22.2
(0.00716) (0.01244) (0.00924) (0.00598)
Ohio 150 0.35475 0.35219 0.09544 0.03003 26.9 8.5
(0.00524) (0.01312) (0.00608) (0.00357)
Pennsylvania 205 0.36963 0.34179 0.09930 0.02020 26.9 5.9
(0.00441) (0.00967) (0.00517) (0.00204)
S. Carolina 225 0.35308 0.45366 0.15726 0.04323 44.5 9.5
(0.00555) (0.02604) (0.00634) (0.00354)
Tennessee 69 0.43795 0.38964 0.22457 0.08887 51.3 22.8
(0.01340) (0.02403) (0.01686) (0.01285)
Texas 235 0.39419 0.35183 0.13689 0.05153 34.7 14.6
(0.00520) (0.01028) (0.00649) (0.00368)
Virginia 134 0.35629 0.27648 0.15890 0.04465 44.6 16.1
(0.00548) (0.01039) (0.00806) (0.00429)
    USA 3843 0.38469 0.32666 0.10756 0.02398 28.0 7.3
(0.00718) (0.01305) (0.00712) (0.00368)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
a Inequality of opportunity according to the father's education and race circumstances.
b Inequality of opportunity in relation to total inequality in percentage.  









Table 3. Overall Inequality and growth within US States: 1980-2000 
         
 
 (1) for 
Theil 0 
 (2) for 
Theil 0 
   (1) for 
Gini 
  (2) for 
Gini 
Lagged per capita income    -0.0018***       
(0.00004) 
  -0.0018*** 
(0.00022) 
  -0.0018***      
(0.00006) 
  -0.0018***   
(0.00027) 








Dum 80  0.4615  
(0.4989) 




   0.7797***  
(0.2313) 
Midwest  -2.2353    
(1.8756) 
-1.0987   
(1.7492) 




West    -7.1877**    
(3.4245) 
-6.1018*        
(3.5746) 
  -7.0111**      
(3.2642) 
-6.0303*    
(3.5642) 
South    -2.8078***       
(0.5117) 
   2.4009*** 
(0.3819) 
  -2.9559***  
(0.3824) 
   2.4225*** 
(0.2353) 
High school    -0.1994*** 
(0.0595) 
  -0.1634*** 
(0.0235) 
  -0.1968*** 
(0.0513) 
  -0.1557*** 
(0.0180) 
College     0.9484***   
(0.0183) 
   1.0676***  
(0.2308) 
   0.9696***   
(0.0444) 
   1.0489***  
(0.2172) 
Mining  --  -0.5972 
(0.7090)  --  -0.5372 
(0.7380) 
Construction  --  -1.8897*  
(0.9568)  --    -1.8892** 
(0.8996) 
Manufacturing  --     0.2369**  
(0.1114)  --     0.2495**  
(0.0991) 
Transportation and public utilities  --  -0.3630 
(0.3021)  --  -0.3438 
(0.3058) 
Finance, insurance and real estate  --  0.4246  
(0.7992)  --  0.4605  
(0.7421) 
Government  --  -0.2018            
(0.2109)  --  -0.1624            
(0.1811) 
Farm/population  --  -0.1121 
(0.0985)  --  -0.1375 
(0.1198) 
Lag change in employment  --     0.0426**  
(0.0178)  --     0.0384*** 
(0.0139) 






 34.5748***   
(10.6005) 
R
2  0.4611  0.6658  0.4491  0.6495 
R
2  Adjusted  0.3446  0.4629  0.3300  0.4562 
F-stat  







3.3596    
(0.0022) 
OLS pooling regression; White cross-section standard errors and covariance estimates. 
Cross-sections included: 23; Total pool (balanced): 46. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 




Table 4. Inequality, IO and growth within US States: 1980-2000 
         
 
(1) for 
Theil 0 and 
IO           
(8 groups) 
(2) for 
Theil 0 and 
IO            
(8 groups) 
 (1) for 
Gini and 
IO            
(8 groups) 
 (2) for 
Gini and 
IO            
(8 groups) 
Lagged per capita income    -0.0018*** 
(0.00004) 
  -0.0017*** 
(0.00012) 
  -0.0020*** 
(0.00006) 
  -0.0018*** 
(0.00023) 
Inequality   -2.9524 
(4.7388) 




 14.8684***  
(5.1708) 






  -9.3317***  
(0.6125) 








Midwest  -1.7147   
(2.1762) 














South    -2.5458***  
(0.8195) 
   2.9601*** 
(0.6996) 
  -2.5153***  
(0.5859) 
   2.6031*** 
(0.3139) 
High school    -0.2246*** 
(0.0680) 
  -0.2490*** 
(0.0231) 
  -0.2885*** 
(0.0320) 
  -0.1889*** 
(0.0063) 
College     1.0005***   
(0.0172) 
   1.2164***  
(0.2297) 
   1.1223***   
(0.0547) 
   1.0878***  
(0.2319) 
Mining  --  -0.6708 
(0.5994)  --  -0.5129 
(0.7081) 
Construction  --    -2.0507*** 
(0.6465)  --    -1.8011** 
(0.7129) 
Manufacturing  --     0.2019**  
(0.0876)  --     0.2679***  
(0.0593) 
Transportation and public utilities  --  -0.4370 
(0.5164)  --  -0.2990 
(0.4365) 
Finance, insurance and real estate  --  0.3026  
(0.7425)  --  0.4388  
(0.7066) 
Government  --  -0.2531            
(0.2109)  --  -0.1027            
(0.1693) 
Farm/population  --     0.0303***   
(0.0044)  --    -0.1090***    
(0.0201) 
Lag change in employment  --     0.0474***   
(0.0017)  --     0.0310*** 
(0.0071) 









2  0.4643  0.6601  0.4634  0.6529 
R
2 Adjusted  0.3303  0.4537  0.3293  0.4422 
F-stat   









OLS pooling regression; White cross-section standard errors and covariance estimates. 
Cross-sections included: 23; Total pool (balanced): 46. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 
(*) significant at the 10% level; (**) significant at the 5% level; (***) significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5. Inequality of opportunity in 1980 and 1990 (2 and 4 groups) 
 
 
State Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0 Gini Theil 0
Arkansas 0.04525 0.01681 0.05985 0.00674 0.03522 0.00865 0.07593 0.02083
(0.00426) (0.00235) (0.00658) (0.00130) (0.00356) (0.00145) (0.00775) (0.00266)
California 0.05206 0.00866 0.05984 0.00735 0.06506 0.01829 0.06792 0.00797
(0.00319) (0.00109) (0.00475) (0.00111) (0.00258) (0.00139) (0.00557) (0.00127)
Florida 0.06870 0.01858 0.11434 0.02466 0.07764 0.04869 0.04832 0.00806
(0.00623) (0.00350) (0.01237) (0.00482) (0.00448) (0.00415) (0.00910) (0.00217)
Georgia 0.06891 0.01855 0.09283 0.01544 0.04440 0.00981 0.11313 0.02432
(0.00677) (0.00342) (0.01055) (0.00336) (0.00436) (0.00183) (0.01189) (0.00458)
Illinois 0.03618 0.00573 0.04220 0.00391 0.08241 0.04617 0.04538 0.00502
(0.00460) (0.00152) (0.00611) (0.00097) (0.00503) (0.00509) (0.00778) (0.00143)
Indiana 0.04658 0.01232 0.07117 0.01011 0.03750 0.01153 0.11986 0.02538
(0.00410) (0.00208) (0.00586) (0.00145) (0.00366) (0.00225) (0.00622) (0.00277)
Iowa 0.00030 0.00008 0.05503 0.02495 0.00214 0.00103 0.09869 0.04205
(0.00000) (0.00030) (0.00913) (0.00400) (0.00092) (0.00044) (0.00950) (0.00690)
Kentucky 0.01852 0.00316 0.11805 0.02502 0.01297 0.00102 0.08430 0.01204
(0.00210) (0.00047) (0.00780) (0.00326) (0.00422) (0.00066) (0.00775) (0.00230)
Luisiana 0.15171 0.04664 0.17443 0.05666 0.11288 0.02600 0.14185 0.03584
(0.01289) (0.00820) (0.01394) (0.00953) (0.01232) (0.00590) (0.01254) (0.00647)
Maryland 0.07397 0.01223 0.11305 0.02277 0.18455 0.09564 0.15154 0.05507
(0.00824) (0.00279) (0.01496) (0.00625) (0.01087) (0.01203) (0.02217) (0.01062)
Massachusetts 0.00234 0.00125 0.05889 0.00620 0.00607 0.00190 0.04637 0.00444
(0.00000) (0.00092) (0.00820) (0.00169) (0.00105) (0.00034) (0.00713) (0.00119)
Michigan 0.03693 0.00703 0.11648 0.08429 0.07972 0.04031 0.14242 0.03618
(0.00376) (0.00146) (0.00819) (0.00907) (0.00453) (0.00470) (0.00872) (0.00409)
Mississippi 0.15316 0.05286 0.15551 0.05609 0.10694 0.02396 0.09600 0.01629
(0.01339) (0.00988) (0.02493) (0.01622) (0.01021) (0.00473) (0.01087) (0.00378)
Missouri 0.01061 0.00060 0.02211 0.00095 0.01179 0.00070 0.09605 0.01713
(0.00369) (0.00044) (0.00707) (0.00087) (0.00421) (0.00056) (0.00848) (0.00296)
New Jersey 0.06578 0.03060 0.04415 0.01030 0.08626 0.03954 0.13820 0.03576
(0.00499) (0.00424) (0.00749) (0.00309) (0.00515) (0.00466) (0.01930) (0.00999)
New York 0.05187 0.01365 0.04941 0.00673 0.03654 0.00559 0.01334 0.00060
(0.00450) (0.00252) (0.00483) (0.00082) (0.00428) (0.00138) (0.00453) (0.00029)
N. Carolina 0.10302 0.03112 0.15196 0.05497 0.14671 0.05085 0.11258 0.02937
(0.00610) (0.00375) (0.01208) (0.00747) (0.00565) (0.00405) (0.01027) (0.00504)
Ohio 0.01288 0.00111 0.02974 0.00155 0.03081 0.00698 0.08070 0.02348
(0.00342) (0.00056) (0.00580) (0.00065) (0.00323) (0.00150) (0.00583) (0.00291)
Pennsylvania 0.02938 0.00610 0.07975 0.01307 0.01910 0.00235 0.07477 0.01317
(0.00267) (0.00113) (0.00780) (0.00235) (0.00330) (0.00086) (0.00496) (0.00156)
S. Carolina 0.10373 0.02700 0.00859 0.00026 0.11095 0.02901 0.08258 0.01726
(0.00688) (0.00362) (0.00563) (0.00044) (0.00529) (0.00286) (0.00601) (0.00196)
Tennessee 0.01165 0.00228 0.09497 0.01758 0.01828 0.00672 0.20515 0.07297
(0.00202) (0.00058) (0.00688) (0.00231) (0.00356) (0.00259) (0.01688) (0.01221)
Texas 0.01211 0.00046 0.03297 0.00290 0.08192 0.02525 0.03183 0.00184
(0.00502) (0.00040) (0.00576) (0.00089) (0.00543) (0.00353) (0.00776) (0.00094)
Virginia 0.01952 0.00260 0.06794 0.00925 0.07228 0.01837 0.12133 0.02922
(0.00314) (0.00084) (0.00604) (0.00157) (0.00435) (0.00219) (0.00885) (0.00390)
    USA 0.04048 0.00815 0.04049 0.00475 0.05721 0.01730 0.07966 0.01097
(0.00515) (0.00265) (0.00664) (0.00180) (0.00493) (0.00318) (0.00791) (0.00290)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
a Inequality of opportunity according to race.
b Inequality of opportunity according to father's education.  
IO (2 groups)











Table 6. Inequality, IO and growth within US States: 1980-2000 
         
 
 (2) for 
Theil 0 and 
IO (Race) 
  (2) for 
Gini and 
IO (Race) 
 (2) for 
Theil 0 and 
IO (Edu) 




Lagged per capita income    -0.0017*** 
(0.00012) 
  -0.0021***  
(0.00007) 
  -0.0017*** 
(0.00015) 
  -0.0018***   
(0.00026) 
Inequality      9.3202***  
(1.0928) 




5.9249   
(6.8464) 
Inequality of opportunity     -48.4542**  
(20.1302) 




1.4117   
(4.5492) 




   0.9934*  
(0.5829) 
   0.7861***   
(0.1983) 
Midwest  -0.4775  
(1.8486) 




-1.0428   
(1.8469) 
West  -6.0225* 
(3.5381) 




-6.0345*   
(3.5892) 
South     2.6166** 
(1.1559) 
   2.4926**  
(0.9341) 
    2.436 *** 
(0.2812) 
   2.4259***   
(0.2474) 
High school    -0.2534*** 
(0.0487) 
  -0.2213**   
(0.0920) 
  -0.1726*** 
(0.0322) 
  -0.1535***   
(0.0254) 
College     1.1997***  
(0.1240) 
   1.1717***   
(0.0899) 
   1.0927***  
(0.2585) 
   1.0486***   
(0.2159) 
Mining  -0.7353 
(0.7955) 




-0.5349   
(0.7400) 




  -1.9889** 
(0.9277) 
  -1.8851**   
(0.9288) 
Manufacturing     0.2335***  
(0.0818) 
   0.3819***   
(0.0434) 
   0.2273*  
(0.1169) 
    0.2522 **  
(0.1109) 
Transportation and public utilities  -0.4569* 
(0.2549) 




-0.3528   
(0.3158) 
Finance, insurance and real estate  0.4020  
(0.6623) 




0.4827   
(0.8071) 
Government  -0.2267            
(0.1858) 
0.1313   
(0.2522) 
-0.2098            
(0.2163) 
-0.1653   
(0.1729) 
Farm/population  -0.0598 
(0.1074) 




-0.1365   
(0.1347) 
Lag change in employment     0.0472*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0115   
(0.0165) 
   0.0499** 
(0.0211) 
   0.0380**   
(0.0156) 
Constant   38.0290*** 
(6.9734) 
 22.0069***   
(6.1383) 
   37.618*** 
(11.6134) 
   34.499***  
(11.1864) 
R
2  0.6658  0.6796  0.6515  0.6497 
R
2 Adjusted  0.4630  0.4851  0.4399  0.4370 
F-stat   









OLS pooling regression; White cross-section standard errors and covariance estimates. 
Cross-sections included: 23; Total pool (balanced): 46. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 





Table 7. Inequality decomposition: IO, IE and growth within US States: 1980-2000 
 
(2) for IO        
8 groups  
(Race and 
Education) 
(2) for IO      
2 groups  
(Race) 
(2) for IO     
4 groups 
(Edu) 
Lagged per capita income    -0.0017*** 
(0.00012) 
  -0.0017***    
(0.00012) 
  -0.0017***   
(0.00015) 
Inequality of effort (IE)       10.7953*** 
(0.4273) 




Inequality of opportunity (IO)    -15.5269*** 
(1.8156) 




Dum 80  0.9122              
(0.5877) 




Midwest  -0.0144            
(1.9480) 
-0.4776    
(1.8486) 
-0.9307   
(1.7887) 






South       2.9601*** 
(0.6996) 
   2.6167** 
(1.1559) 
     2.4361*** 
(0.2812) 
High school     -0.2490*** 
(0.0231) 
   -0.2534*** 
(0.0487) 
    -0.1725*** 
(0.0322) 
College       1.2164*** 
(0.2298) 
     1.1997***  
(0.1240) 
     1.0928***  
(0.2585) 
Mining  -0.6707             
(0.5994) 








  -1.9889** 
(0.9277) 
Manufacturing     0.2019**      
(0.0876) 
     0.2335***  
(0.0818) 
  0.2273*  
(0.1169) 






Finance, insurance and real estate  0.3026             
(0.7425) 




Government  -0.2531                
(0.2109) 
-0.2268            
(0.1858) 
-0.2098            
(0.2163) 
Farm/population       0.0303*** 
(0.0045) 




Lag change in employment       0.0474***  
(0.0018) 
     0.0472*** 
(0.0075) 
   0.0499** 
(0.0211) 
Constant      39.9814*** 
(7.9087) 
    38.0290*** 
(6.9734) 
     37.6182*** 
(11.6135) 
R
2  0.6601  0.6658  0.6515 
R
2 Adjusted  0.4537  0.4630  0.4399 
F-stat   
(p-value in parenthesis) 
3.1979                
(0.0031) 




OLS pooling regression; White cross-section standard errors and covariance estimates. 
Cross-sections included: 23; Total pool (balanced): 46. Standard deviations in parenthesis. 





Table 8. The IO and IE components when reducing recursively the number of US States 
             
States  IE  std  p-value  IO  std  p-value 
23    All   10.795  0.427  0.000  -15.527  1.816  0.000 
22    Arkansas   7.705  1.602  0.000  -15.062  4.814  0.004 
21    Tennessee   8.278  1.271  0.000  -13.729  5.760  0.025 
20    Kentucky   11.727  5.581  0.047  -11.468  6.527  0.093 
19    Iowa   10.591  5.977  0.092  -10.727  4.319  0.022 
18    Louisiana  11.831  6.828  0.100  -8.579  4.883  0.096 
17    Indiana  24.308  8.808  0.014  -11.051  2.501  0.000 
16    Massachusetts   26.465  10.472  0.024  -27.679  16.342  0.112 
15    New Jersey   30.515  6.565  0.001  -27.650  14.921  0.089 
14    Georgia   46.874  0.7712  0.000  -34.795  7.814  0.001 
13    Missouri   60.030  3.195  0.000  -56.266  16.068  0.008 
12    Illinois   68.837  4.179  0.000  -154.787  6.209  0.000 
11    Florida   70.015  3.933  0.000  -135.742  2.828  0.000 
10    Virginia   35.866  4.980  0.019  -89.200  6.042  0.005 
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